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10, 1987, auction? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to consider the 
affidavit of Harold L. Petersen as an admission by Trunzo as a 
party opponent. 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to liberally 
construe Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
considering the affidavit of Harold L. Petersen. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to 
recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, 
at any time after the expiration of 20 days 
from the commencement of the action or after 
service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
his favor upon all or any parts thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone, although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should 
it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for a judgment or may order a 
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c on t i nu an c e t o p e t:i i t j. t: a f f i d a v i t s t o be o b t a i n e d 
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
h a d o r in, a k e s u c h o t h e r o r a s j s j u s t. 
Utah Ru] es of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2), Admission by 
Par ty Oppoi lei it. 
The statement is offered against a party and 
is (A) his own statement, in either his 
individual or representative capacity, or 
(B) a statement of which he has manifested 
his adoption or belief in its truth, or 
(C) a statement by a person authorized by 
him to make a statement concerning the 
subject, or (D) a statement by his agent 
or servant concerning a matter within a 
scope of his agency or employment, made 
duri ng the existence of the relationship 
or (E) a statement by a conspirator of a 
party during the course and :i n f u r t h era n c e 
o f t h e c o n s p i r a c y . 
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Insurance Company issued an auctioneer's license or permit bond, 
Bond No. ULI 980608, to S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers Inc. in favor of 
Mountain Bell. The amount of said bond was $45,000. (R. at 315.) 
5. Prior to the October 10, 1987 auction, Mountain 
Bell's employee, Walter Williams, was informed by Bentley and 
Frank Trunzo that the assets of Trunzo would be sold to Bentley 
and/or Bentley International. (R. at 151.) 
6. On or about July 8, 1987, S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers 
Inc., through its president Frank Trunzo, sold to Gary Bentley the 
assets of S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers Inc. and witnessed that sale by 
executing a sale and security agreement. (R. at 303.) 
7. The bond issued by defendant Old Republic Insurance 
Company to Trunzo referred to above in favor of Mountain Bell was 
in no way to benefit Gary Bentley or Bentley International. (R. 
at 315.) 
8. Williams made arrangements with Bentley to auction 
Mountain Bell equipment for an auction to be held on October 19, 
1987. An auction of Mountain Bell's equipment was held on that 
date and Mountain Bell equipment was auctioned off in an amount 
exceeding $45,000. Bentley failed to pay Mountain Bell the pro-
ceeds of the auction. Mountain Bell made demands upon Bentley to 
remit the proceeds of the auction and Bentley allegedly assured 
Mountain Bell representatives that the proceeds would be paid. On 
or about October 29, 1987, Mountain Bell representatives received 
a check for $47,705.64, representing the proceeds of the auction 
from Bentley. The check was drawn on an account in the name of 
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"Bentley International" and was signed by Gary L. Bentley. The 
check was subsequently dishonored upon payment and marked 
"insufficient funds." (R. at 4-6.) 
9. On or about December 3, 1987, Mountain Bell 
representatives made a demand upon the Old Republic Insurance 
Company pursuant to the bond issued to S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, 
Bond No. ULI 980608. Mountain Bell alleged that S. F. Trunzo 
Auctioneers Inc. had failed to effectively comply with all 
ordinances and rules and regulations concerning its auctioneer's 
license. (R. at 107.) 
10. The Old Republic Insurance Company denied liability 
for the actions of Bentley and asserted that Bentley was not 
acting as an authorized agent of S, F. Trunzo Auctioneers Inc. 
with respect to the October 10, 1987 auction of Mountain Bell 
equipment. (R. at 64, R. at 324.) 
11. On or about January 28, 1988, Mountain Bell caused a 
complaint to be filed against Gary Bentley, Bentley International, 
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers Inc., and the Old Republic Insurance 
Company. (R. at 2.) 
12. A default judgment was entered against Gary L. 
Bentley and dba Bentley International on or about March 4, 1988. 
On or about March 11, 1988, a default judgment was entered against 
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers Inc. (R. at 46-47, 55-56.) 
13. On or about November 17, 1988, Mountain Bell filed a 
motion for summary judgment against defendant Old Republic 
Insurance Company based primarily upon the failure of Old Republic 
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Insurance Company to respond to Mountain Bell's request for 
admissions. In response to plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, defendant caused a motion for withdrawal or amendment of 
admissions to be filed with the court, along with an accompanying 
memorandum supporting said motion. Said motion was filed on or 
about November 29, 1988. Additionally, defendant caused a 
memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment to be filed on November 29, 1988. (R. at 102, 193, 196.) 
14. On or about December 5, 1988, the Honorable Judge 
Young granted defendant's motion for withdrawal or amendment of 
admissions and allowed plaintiff to re-notice its summary judgment 
request as it deemed appropriate. (R. at 200.) 
15. On or about December 12, 1988, plaintiff filed a 
pleading entitled renewed request to submit motion for summary 
judgment for a decision. In response to said pleading, defendant 
The Old Republic Insurance Company filed a memorandum in 
opposition to plaintiff's renewed motion for summary judgment and 
attached to its memorandum affidavits of Merrill G. Mitchell and 
Harold L. Petersen. (R. at 291, 299.) 
16. On December 22, 1988, the court requested oral 
argument with respect to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
(R. at 298.) 
17. On or about December 28, 1988, plaintiff caused to 
be filed a motion to strike memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's 
renewed motion for summary judgment and to strike the affidavits 
of Merrill G. Mitchell and Harold L. Petersen. A responsive 
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pleading was filed by defendant Old Republic Insurance Company on 
or about January 10. On January 12, plaintiff filed a request to 
submit motion to strike for decision. (R. at 323, 332, 335, 356.) 
18. On January 23, 1989, the court heard the plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment and granted the same. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to find that a material 
issue of fact existed with respect to whether or not Bentley had 
apparent authority to act on behalf of Trunzo at the time of the 
October 10, 1987 auction. In connection with the agency issue, 
the trial court failed to find that an issue of fact existed with 
respect to whether or not Mountain Bell had knowledge of Trunzo!s 
sale of its assets to Bentley. The court should have considered 
the affidavit of Harold L. Petersen as an admission by Trunzo and 
thus concluded that Bentley was unauthorized to act on behalf of 
Trunzo at the time of the October 10, 1987 auction, and that 
Mountain Bell had knowledge that Bentley was acting independent of 
Trunzo at the time of the said auction. Additionally, the court 
in the alternative should have construed the affidavit of Harold 
L. Petersen as a Rule 56(f) affidavit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT EXISTED WITH 
RESPECT TO WHETHER BENTLEY HAD APPARENT 
AUTHORITY IN CONDUCTING THE OCTOBER 10, 
1987 AUCTION. 
In ruling on an appeal from an adverse decision on a 
motion for summary judgment, the court should inquire whether 
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there is any genuine issue as to any material fact and, in 
addition, if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
In Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 750 P.2d 539, 540 
(Utah 1988), the Supreme Court stated: 
In reviewing the record on appeal from summary 
judgment, we treat the statements and eviden-
tiary materials of the appellant as if a jury 
would receive them as the only credible 
evidence, and we sustain the judgment only if 
no issues of material fact which could affect 
the outcome can be discerned. 
Old Republic asserts that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to the agency and authority of Bentley 
to act for and in behalf of Trunzo Auctioneers Inc. (hereinafter 
"Trunzo"). In City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 
P.2d 89 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court discussed the elements of 
apparent authority with respect to the agency issue. 
It is well settled law that apparent or 
ostensible authority of an agent can be 
inferred only from the acts and conduct 
of the principal. Bank of Salt Lake v. 
Corporation of President of Ch., etc., 
Utah, 534 P.2d 887 (1975). Where cor-
porate liability is sought for acts of 
its agent under apparent authority, lia-
bility is premised upon the corporation's 
knowledge of an acquiescence in the con-
duct of its agent which has led third 
parties to rely upon the agent's actions. 
Kiniski v. Archway Motel, Inc., Wash.App. 
21 Wash.App. 555, 586 P.2d 502 (Utah 
1978); Restatement, Agency Second §43. 
Nor is the authority of the agent 
"apparent" merely because it looks so to 
the person with whom he deals. rd. It is 
the principal who must cause third parties 
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to believe that the agent is clothed with 
apparent authority. 
Id. at 90. 
In City Electric, an action was brought by Material 
Suppliers to recover amounts due and owing on an open account from 
an automobile dealership. Mike Evans, an assistant secretary and 
employee of the defendant automobile dealership, contemplated 
remodeling his restaurant known as "Johnny Rider's Backstage 
Restaurant." A fellow employee of the defendant automobile 
dealership, one Dave Sturgill, became aware of Evans1 intent to 
remodel the restaurant. Sturgill had previously been employed by 
plaintiff City Electric and volunteered to contact plaintiff to 
see if he could obtain a good price on material needed to remodel 
the restaurant. Sturgill telephoned Don Hatch, plaintiff's inside 
sales manager, and asked Hatch whether he could establish an 
account and whether Hatch could give him fair prices on the 
materials ordered. 
One day after the telephone conversation, the first order 
was placed with plaintiff. Hatch looked on the computer printouts 
for addresses and open accounts and found that the defendant 
automobile dealership had an account with plaintiff. Materials 
were supplied to the restaurant and billed to defendant. 
According to a penciled notation on two invoices, payment of the 
two invoices was made by someone in December of 1978. Suit was 
brought by plaintiff against the defendant to collect outstanding 
sums totaling approximately $2,300. At the end of the plaintiff's 
presentation, defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that 
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plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case. The trial 
court denied that motion, defendant rested without calling any 
witnesses and a judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff. 
The dispositive issue on appeal was the question of 
agency. The trial court found that Mike Evans, as assistant 
secretary to defendant, had instructed that the purchases were to 
be charged to defendant's account with plaintiff. Additionally, 
the trial court found that Mr. Sturgill informed Mr. Hatch that he 
was acting on Mike Evans' directions and informed him that 
material purchased should be charged to defendant's accounts. 
From those findings, the trial court concluded that both Mike 
Evans and Sturgill had apparent authority to act on defendant's 
behalf and the defendant was therefore bound by the representations 
and actions of its agents which plaintiff relied upon. 
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court stated: 
•Under the applicable standard of review this 
court will accord the finding of the trial 
court a presumption of validity and correctness 
so long as there is support for them in the 
evidence. [Citation omitted]. That support is 
singular absent in this case. None of the 
principals testified at trial so that knowledge 
of and acquiescence in Sturgill's conduct could 
not be ascertained from them. Sturgill's 
apparent authority was never established. 
Id. at 91. 
Although there may be some evidence to support apparent 
authority on behalf of Bentley to act on behalf of Trunzo prior to 
the October 10, 1987 auction, whether such apparent authority 
existed at the time of the auction of October 10, 1987, is not 
clearly supported by the record. Plaintiff's employee, Walter 
-10-
Williams, was informed prior to the October 10, 1987 auction that 
Trunzo intended to sell the assets of his auction company to 
Bentley. 
In Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), the 
court noted that the one who deals with an agent has the 
responsibility to ascertain his authority. 
The general rule is that one who deals with 
an agent has the responsibility to ascertain 
the agent's authority despite the agent's 
representations. 
Id. at 78. Moreover, it has been held that apparent authority 
vanishes when the third party has knowledge of the real scope of 
the agent's authority. Bank of Oregon v. Highway Products, 598 
P.2d 318 (Or.App. 1979). The affidavit of Mountain Bell's 
employee, Walter Williams, reflects that a material issue of fact 
existed as to whether or not Mountain Bell had knowledge of the 
scope of Bentley's authority following the sale of S. F. Trunzo 
Auctioneers' assets to Bentley. Mr. Williams' affidavit indicated 
that "In the weeks preceding the October 10, 1987 auction, Frank 
Trunzo and Gary Bentley informed me that the assets of Trunzo 
would be sold to Bentley International after the auction was held." 
The affidavit of Harold Petersen indicates that Trunzo 
told Mountain Bell's employee, Walter Williams, on more than one 
occasion that Bentley was responsible for the October 10, 1987 
auction. However, the affidavit of Mr. Williams alone, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to appellant, raises a material 
issue of fact as to whether or not Trunzo's informing Williams of 
Trunzo's pending sale put Mountain Bell on notice to inquire as to 
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whether or not Bentley had the power to act on behalf of Trunzo. 
In Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 
(Utah 1983), the court noted that apparent authority exists: 
[WJhere a person has created such an appearance 
of things that it causes a third party reason-
ably and prudently to believe that a second 
party has the power to act on behalf of the 
first person . . . . 
Id. at 75 (citing from Wayne v. McMahon Ford Co., 414 S.W.2d 330, 
336 (Mo.App. 1967) . 
Whether Trunzo created such an appearance of things that 
caused Mountain Bell to reasonably and prudently believe that 
Bentley had the power to act on behalf of Trunzo is clearly an 
issue of fact and not appropriate for summary judgment. 
A. The Question of Apparent Authority is an Issue 
for the Trier of Fact and Not Appropriate for 
Summary Judgment. 
In Bailey v. Ness, 708 P.2d 900 (Idaho 1985), the Idaho 
Supreme Court noted the general principles of apparent authority 
and then emphasized that such an issue is a question for the trier 
of fact and not appropriate for summary judgment. 
Apparent authority differs from actual 
authority. It is created when the principal 
"voluntarily places an agent in such a 
position that a person of ordinary prudence, 
conversant with the business usages and the 
nature of a particular business, is justified 
in believing that the agent is acting pursuant 
to existing authority." [Citations omitted] 
Apparent authority cannot be created by the 
acts and statements of the agents alone. 
[Citation omitted] Finally, significant to 
this appeal, where the existence of an agency 
relationship is disputed--whether or not there 
is apparent authority on the agent's part to 
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act as the acted--it is a question for the 
trier of fact to resolve from the evidence. 
[Citations omitted] Our review of cases from 
other jurisdictions reveals that this is the 
majority rule. [Citations omitted] 
Id. at 903 (court's emphasis). 
The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the same principle 
that issue of agency is ordinarily a question of fact. In 
Stortoren v. Beneficial Finance Co., 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987), 
the Colorado Supreme Court held that, "The existence of an agency 
relationship is ordinarily a question of fact . . . " The court 
noted the only exception, that being that the issue of agency can 
be decided as a matter of law "when the facts are not in dispute." 
Id. at 395. 
Other neighboring jurisdictions recognize the same 
principle, that the issue of agency is one normally reserved for 
the trier of fact. See Foster v. Cross, 650 P.2d 401 (Alaska 
1982); Northern Nevada Mobile Home Brokers v. Penrod, 610 P.2d 724 
(Nev. 1980); Fryar v. Employee's Insurance of Wausau, 607 P.2d 615 
(N.M. 1980). 
Inasmuch as facts are in dispute, the issue of apparent 
agency is a question reserved for the trier of fact. When the 
evidence is construed in favor of the non-moving party, a genuine 
issue of material fact exists with regard to the agency 
relationship between Bentley and Trunzo at the time of the October 
10, 1987 auction and as such, the issue should be resolved by the 
trier of fact from the evidence. 
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POINT II. 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD L. PETERSEN SHOULD 
BE CONSTRUED AS AN ADMISSION BY A PARTY 
OPPONENT. 
Defendant attached to its memorandum in opposition to 
plaintifffs renewed motion for summary judgment the affidavit of 
Harold L. Petersen. In said affidavit, Mr. Petersen testified 
that he had had discussions with Mr. Trunzo in his office and that 
Mr. Trunzo indicated that Mountain Bell's representative, Walter 
Williams, was told on more than one occasion that Bentley was 
solely responsible for the October 10, 1987 auction as a result of 
Trunzo selling his auction business to Bentley. 
Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in part 
as follows: 
(c) Hearsay. 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. 
* * * 
(2) Admission by Party—Opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and is 
(a) his own statement, in either his individual 
or representative capacity . . . 
Admissions by a party opponent are excluded 
from the category of hearsay on the theory that 
their admissibility in evidence is the result 
of the adversary system rather than satisfaction 
of the condition of the hearsay rule. 
4 Wigmore, Evidence §1048 (Chadbourn Revised 1972). 
-14-
The Hawaii Supreme Court in interpreting Hawaii's simil 
provision to Utah Rule of Evidence 801 stated: 
[P]arty admissions, unlike statements against 
interests, need not have been against the 
declarant's interest when made, need not be 
based on the declarant's personal knowledge, 
may be in the form of an opinion, and are 
admissible at trial regardless of whether the 
declarant is unavailable. 
Id. at 1165 (quoting from Kekua v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 6 
P.2d 364, 370 (Hawaii 1979). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also adoped the rule that 
out-of-court statement of parties to litigation are non-hearsay. 
The out-of-court statements of parties to a 
litigation are, and always have been, admis-
sible, whether classified as non-hearsay or as 
an exception to the hearsay rule. We believe 
that the better approach is to simply classify 
those statements as non-hearsay. This approach 
has been adopted jn the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence §801(d)(2). 
The reason for classifying these types of 
statements as non-hearsay is that "their 
admissibility in evidence is the result of the 
adversary system rather than satisfaction of 
the conditions of the hearsay rule." 
Advisory Committee's note to Federal Rule of 
Evidence, 801(d)(2), 11 Moore's Federal Practice 
VIII-42 (2nd Ed. 1976), and Cumulative Supple-
ment; United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670 
(1st Cir. 1978) . 
Jolley v. Clay, 646 P.2d 413, 417 (Id. 1982). 
The out-of-court statement by Trunzo as reported in 
Mr. Petersen's affidavit should be construed as admissible 
evidence and sufficient to raise a material issue of fact with 
respect to the agency authority of Bentley at the time of the 
October 10, 1987 auction. 
-15-
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DENY 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO RULE 56F 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
At the hearing on the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, defendant requested the court, in the alternative, to 
construe the Affidavit of Harold L. Petersen as an affidavit filed 
under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(f) 
provides: 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should 
it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for a judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained 
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or make such other or as is just. 
At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, it was represented to the court that Mr. Trunzo was 
unavailable and could not be located, that it was believed, based 
upon interviews conducted previously with Mr. Trunzo that if he 
were available, he would testify that Bentley was solely responsi-
ble for the Mountain Bell auction. 
The Hawaii Court of Appeals in Crutchfield v. Hart, 6 30 
P.2d 124 (Ha.App. 1981), noted that it was well settled that the 
courts in dealing with the identical provision of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 45(f) construe it liberally. 
The purpose of subdivision (f) is to provide 
an additional safeguard against an improvident 
or premature grant of summary judgment and the 
rule generally has been applied to achieve 
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that objective. Consistent with this purpose, 
the courts have stated that technical rulings 
have no place under the subdivision and they 
should be applied with the spirit of liberality. 
Id. at 125, citing 10 Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, §2740 at 724 (1973). 
In Crutchfield, the Hawaii Appellate Court reversed the 
lower court's grant of summary judgment despite the fact that the 
party defending against the motion for summary judgment failed to 
file affidavits pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
Although the technical requirements of Rule 56(f) may be 
somewhat deficient, the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's 
motion and denying defendant the right to a trial where there 
existed a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether 
the actions of Bentley in conducting the Mountain Bell auction on 
October 10, 1987, fall under the grant of coverage provided by the 
bond issue by defendant Old Republic. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant The Old Republic 
Insurance Company respectfully requests that this court reverse 
the decision of the trial court and remand for trial. 
DATED this /"V day of May, 1989. 
STRONG & ILANNI 
By ^W/XJPJ^ 
Joseph/J/ qo royce 
Attornfeyfe for Defendant-
Appellant The Old Republic 
Insurance Company 
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